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Abstract— This study investigates the relationship between
resilience of control systems to attacks and the information
available to malicious attackers. Specifically, it is shown that
control systems are guaranteed to be secure in an asymptotic
manner by rendering reactions against potentially harmful ac-
tions covert. The behaviors of the attacker and the defender are
analyzed through a repeated signaling game with an undisclosed
belief under covert reactions. In the typical setting of signaling
games, reactions conducted by the defender are supposed
to be public information and the measurability enables the
attacker to accurately trace transitions of the defender’s belief
on existence of a malicious attacker. In contrast, the belief in
the game considered in this paper is undisclosed and hence
common equilibrium concepts can no longer be employed for
the analysis. To surmount this difficulty, a novel framework
for decision of reasonable strategies of the players in the
game is introduced. Based on the presented framework, it
is revealed that any reasonable strategy chosen by a rational
malicious attacker converges to the benign behavior as long as
the reactions performed by the defender are unobservable to the
attacker. The result provides an explicit relationship between
resilience and information, which indicates the importance of
covertness of reactions for designing secure control systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern cyber-physical systems are facing malicious ac-
tions by sophisticated adversaries because of increasing
interconnectivity of the cyber and physical layers. In fact,
various incidents on cyber attacks on physical systems have
been reported, which cover a broad range of applications
such as an attack on an uranium enrichment plant, attacks on
Ukrainian power plants, remote car hacking, and unmanned
aerial vehicle hacking [1]–[4]. Thus, analysis and synthesis
of resilient cyber-physical systems have become a crucial
topic in our community.
There are numerous studies discussing resilience of cyber-
physical systems based on control theory, in which several
definitions of resilience have been proposed thus far; see [5]–
[13]. In the existing studies, the control system to be de-
fended is supposed to be protected with an attack-detection
scheme. Accordingly, the behavioral principle of malicious
attackers is given as maximizing impacts on behavior of the
control system through attacks without being detected. In
this framework, behaviors of the system, the attacker, and
the defender after an alarm are not concerned. An implicit
premise is that effects of malicious attacks can immediately
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be eliminated or an excessive reaction, e.g., terminating the
entire system, is performed once an alarm rings.
In actual systems, however, the post-alarm process should
carefully be analyzed because root-cause analysis of anoma-
lies is difficult and also suspension of whole parts of the
system is undesirable due to false alarms and costs. An
approach to cope with attacks more flexibly is to choose a
proper reaction against potentially executed harmful actions
depending on the level of confidence on existence of a
malicious attacker. An example can be provided for net-
worked systems, in which disconnecting some components
that are presumed to be attacked is more acceptable than
simply terminating the entire network when the operator’s
confidence is not firm. The technical problem here is that, un-
der this scenario sophisticated attackers choose their actions
according to their measurement on the state of the system as
well as defender’s reactions. Thus we can no longer employ
the existing frameworks for resilience assessment because
it is now required to handle interactions between attacker’s
actions and defender’s reactions unlike the case where the
attacker simply avoids being detected.
This study investigates the relationship between resilience
of control systems and information available to malicious
attackers under the setting above motivated by the following
consideration. Suppose that a malicious attacker can fully
observe reactions executed by the defender. When observing
aggressive reactions, the attacker recognizes that the con-
fidence on existence of a malicious attacker is fairly firm
and then a reasonable behavior of the attacker is to stay
calm. Conversely, if a non-aggressive reaction is observed,
the attacker is allowed to execute an offensive action. This
discussion leads to the expectation that leak of information
on the reactions implemented by the defender causes serious
damage to the system, and conversely, also that resilience is
enhanced by rendering reactions covert. A naturally arising
question here is how, and how much, the resilience is
strengthened by covertness of reactions.
In order to give an answer to the question, we analyze
the situation using game theory. In particular, we formulate
behaviors of the decision makers as a repeated signaling
game [14]. In a signaling game, there are two players, one
of which, referred to as a sender, has private information
called type and chooses her action based on her preference
depending on her type [15], [16]. The action has a role
as signaling to the other player, referred to as a receiver,
who forms a belief on the sender’s type based on received
signals and chooses a reasonable reaction under the belief.
A widely employed solution concept is perfect Bayesian
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Nash equilibria, on which both player’s strategies are best
responses to each other and the belief of the receiver is
updated based on Bayes’ rule. Typically, the reasonable
actions of the players are supposed to be given as one of
the equilibria on the premise that the prior belief and its
transition are public information. In our case, however, the
exact value of the belief is undisclosed to the attacker owing
to covertness of reactions and hence her reasonable strategies
cannot be determined using the usual concept. Because the
accurate value of the belief is unknown, the attacker has
to estimate the belief, i.e., “belief of belief” is required
for determining the attacker’s reasonable actions. To handle
this situation, we introduce a novel framework, under which
the estimated belief is specifically given as the conditional
expected value of the true belief. Based on the framework,
we can determine well-posed reasonable attacker’s actions.
Our analysis under the presented framework reveals that
asymptotic security is achieved by covert reaction for general
control systems. Specifically, it is shown that any reasonable
strategy chosen by a rational malicious attacker converges to
the benign behavior as time proceeds. The finding is based
on the fact that the estimated belief from the attacker is a
monotonically non-decreasing function whatever strategy the
attacker chooses. From the monotonicity, the estimated belief
is eventually increased as the game proceeds. When the belief
is sufficiently large the reasonable action is restricted to the
most unsuspicious behavior, which is given by the benign
behavior. The obtained result gives an explicit relationship
between resilience and information and suggests that covert-
ness of reactions is an essential requirement for designing
secure control systems.
Existing literature considering control systems under
Bayesian games where some players do not have exact values
of other players’ beliefs can be found [17]–[20]. Typically,
the situation emerges with asymmetric information, i.e., some
information of the game is assumed to be private. The
approach for handling the situation in [17]–[19] is based on
the idea that the belief of all players are constructed only with
common information. It is shown in [20] that if the game
is a linear quadratic game then the true belief is constructed
only with each player’s local information. Analysis of system
security based on signaling game is studied in [21], the
modeling in which is similar to ours. The main difference
compared to this study is that the belief is assumed to be
known to both players and a single stage game is considered
in [21]. In economics literature, games without knowledge
of actions performed by players are categorized into a
Bayesian game with imperfect information, in which the
solution concept is given as sequential equilibria [22]–[24].
Our solution concept differs from sequential equilibria from
the perspective that our concept is given with the sender’s
belief about the receiver’s belief while sequential equilibria
are given with the sender’s belief about all variables in the
game on each information set. Furthermore, the notion of
hierarchies of beliefs is proposed for treating the “belief of
belief” concept in the general setup [25], [26].
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II,
we first show a motivating example for our analysis. Then we
give the model of the system to be defended and behaviors
of a malicious attacker and the defender based on a repeated
signaling game formulation. Section III provides an analysis
of the formulated game and reveals that asymptotic security
is achieved by covert reaction. The theoretical findings are
verified through a numerical example in Section IV and
Section V draws conclusion.
Notation
Let Z+ and R denote the sets of nonnegative integers and
real numbers, respectively. Let P(X ) denote the power set
of a set X . The probability space considered in this paper
is denoted by (Ω,F,Prob). We use upper case letters for
random variables and lower case letters for their realizations.
The expected value of X is denoted by E[X]. For a random
variable X : Ω → X , we use X ∈ X for representing its
codomain. For discrete random variables X and Y , let p(x)
and p(y|x) denote the probability mass function of X and
the conditional probability mass function of Y given X =
x, respectively. Similarly, E[Y |x] denotes the conditional
expected value of Y given X = x. Let x0:k denote a tuple
(x0, . . . , xk) of the sequence x0, . . . , xk.
II. CONTROL SYSTEM WITH COVERT REACTION
A. Motivating Example
Consider the networked system shown in Fig. 1. The
upstream process and the downstream process are intercon-
nected through a network over an overt channel. The overt
channel is possibly under man-in-the-middle attack where the
adversary can receive and alter the signal on the channel. To
cope with the attack, the system operator equips a redundant
secure channel, called covert channel [27], through which
secret information can be transferred being unrecognized by
other third parties. A covert channel is typically regarded as
a vulnerability of communication [28] but can proactively be
used for enhancing reliability [29]. Although the subsystems
can securely communicate through the covert channel, the
overt channel is preferable to use if no attacks are executed
since communication over the covert channel requires an
unusual protocol and would cause a high cost or performance
degradation. Moreover, the operator utilizes the model-based
anomaly detection scheme [30] with which the defender
can observe the residual obtained as the difference between
the actual signal through the overt channel and the ideal
signal calculated through a model of the system. Basically,
the residual is not always zero owing to noise but is small
without attacks and hence large residual encourages the
operator to use the covert channel. The objective of the
operator is to achieve an efficient operation by properly
choosing the channel used for the communication at each
time step based on the measured residual. Conversely, the
objective of the adversary is to disturb the downstream
process by choosing proper signals on the overt channel.
We now explain the idea of “covert reaction” with this
example. Let us suppose that no data is transferred through
the overt channel when the covert channel is used. Then the
upstream
process
downstream
process
covert channel
overt channel
adversary operator
residual
Fig. 1. Example: A networked system with an overt channel under man-
in-the-middle attack and a secure covert channel that would cause a costly
communication or performance degradation.
adversary can recognize the channel used for each commu-
nication, which corresponds to the case of overt reaction.
If usage of the overt channel is observed, which indicates
that presence of the attacker is not suspected, then large
disturbance can be injected. If no data through the over
channel is observed, the attacker tries to lurk by stopping
injection of attacks. Hence, in the case of overt reaction,
the adversary can choose a reasonable action according to
the observed scenario. A possible approach that inhibits this
strategy is to transfer data through both the channels when
the covert channel is used for actual communication. Then,
because the overt channel is used in both cases, the true
scenario cannot be identified from the attacker’s perspective,
which corresponds to the case of covert reaction. Thus, in
the case of covert reaction, the adversary has to take an
alternative strategy, under which the damage on the system
would be less harmful. From this discussion, we expect that
covert reaction can enhance resilience of control systems.
This example motivates us to thoroughly analyze resilience
of control systems with covert reaction. In the next subsec-
tion, we provide a model of the control system to be defended
for mathematical analysis.
B. System Description
Consider a control system being possibly under attack
shown in Fig. 2. Let Uk ∈ U and Xk ∈ X denote the
input signal and the state of the system at the time step
k ∈ Z+, respectively. The input signals are assumed to be
mutually independent, i.e., Ui and Uj are independent for
any i, j ∈ Z+. There is a party, called a sender, who can
alter the behavior of the system through an action ak ∈ A.
Let θ ∈ Θ = {θb, θm} denote the type of the sender, where
the symbols θb and θm imply that the sender is benign or
malicious, respectively. The case θ = θb corresponds to
the control system under normal operation where effects
of the action ak can be ignored, e.g., ak = 0 if A is
the Euclidean space. We denote the map of the system by
Σk : Uk+1 × A → X . Then the kth state is determined
according to the relationship xk = Σk(u0:k, ak) with given
input signals and an action where effects of the initial value
of the state are ignored because the analysis in this paper is
independent of the initial value. Note that we assume that
the state is affected only by the instantaneous action. This
property is favorable to the attacker in terms of avoidance of
detection because there are no lingering effects of an attack.
In this sense, we consider a severe situation for defending
the control system.
To detect the existence of a malicious sender and cope
with potentially malicious actions, we consider a commonly
control system uncertainty
benign simulator receiver
sender
Fig. 2. Signal-flow diagram of the system under potentially malicious
actions and the defense architecture for detection and reaction.
used detection and reaction architecture shown in Fig. 2.
The basic idea of the defense mechanism is to compare the
actual signal and the ideal signal under the normal operation
and to perform a proper reaction based on the result of
the detection process. Let Yk ∈ Y denote the measurement
output which is obtained through an uncertain environment,
e.g., noisy measurement and modeling error. The character-
istic of the uncertainty is modeled by a memoryless channel
λk(yk|xk) := p(yk|xk) = p(yk|x0:k). The memoryless
property is also favorable to the attacker for the same reason
as the one of the control system. Let Xˆk ∈ X denote the ideal
state at the kth step under the benign operation generated
through the benign simulator xˆk = Σk(u0:k, ak) where ak is
the action that is performed if the sender is benign. Note that
ak is known to the players owing to Assumption 3 shown
below. Based on the measurement, the other party, called a
receiver, chooses an action rk ∈ R at each time step. We
henceforth refer to rk as a reaction for emphasizing that rk
denotes a counteraction against potentially malicious attacks.
For avoiding trivial discussions, we make an assumption
that guarantees validity of the defense architecture.
Assumption 1 (Valid Defense Architecture) The defense
architecture is valid, i.e.,
1) For any u0:k, if xk = xˆk then ak = ak.
2) Let I(Xk;Yk) denote the mutual information of Xk
and Yk [31]. Then infk∈Z+ I(Xk;Yk) > 0 holds.
The first assumption means that the system is input observ-
able [32], i.e., any malicious attack is immediately noticeable
if there is no uncertainty in the measurement process. Owing
to this assumption, we disregard attacks that are impossible
to detect even with the most powerful detection tool, such
as covert attacks [33] and zero-dynamics attacks [34]. The
second assumption simply states that the measurement signal
has nonzero information on the state, which means that the
channel is valid for attack detection including the limit.
Moreover, for simplicity, the following technical assump-
tion is made.
Assumption 2 (Discrete Variables) The sets of signals and
actions, namely, U ,X ,Y,A,R are finite sets.
Assumption 2 makes all random variables discrete. Then it
suffices to consider only probability mass functions.
C. Game Description
Based on the system description, we provide each player’s
decision policy about her actions through a repeated game
formulation. For the formulation, the notions of strategy,
utility, belief, and best response are needed.
The sender chooses an action at each time step based on
the type and available information. Let ssk ∈ Ssk denote the
strategy of the sender at the kth step. Suppose that the sender
uses pure strategies. Then the space of the kth sender’s
strategies is given by Ssk = {ssk : Θ × Isk → A} where
Isk denotes the set of the kth sender’s available information,
which consists of signals measured by the sender at the
kth step. The elements of Isk, referred to as information
sets in game theory, are explicitly determined in the next
subsection (see Assumption 4). Similarly, let srk ∈ Srk denote
the strategy of the receiver at the kth step. The receiver uses
pure strategies as well and then the space of the kth receiver’s
strategies is given by Srk = {srk : Irk → R} where Irk denotes
the set of the kth receiver’s available information.
Utilities are employed for representing players’ prefer-
ences. Let Usk : Θ ×X ×A×R → R denote an immediate
utility function for the sender such that Usk(θ, xk, ak, rk)
gives the utility that she receives when her type is θ, the
sender plays the action ak, and the receiver chooses the
reaction rk. Similarly, let Urk : Θ ×X ×A×R → R denote
the receiver’s utility function such that Urk(θ, xk, ak, rk)
gives her payoff under the same scenario.
As a preparation for analysis, we put an assumption on
preferences of the benign sender. We suppose that the system
is optimally controlled without any specific actions of the
sender and then actions plays the role only to disturb the
system. Since the benign sender has no motivation to disturb
the system, doing nothing becomes the optimal action. The
following assumption is made.
Assumption 3 (Benign Sender’s Preference) There exists
ab ∈ A such that Usk(θb, xb, ab, r) > Usk(θb, x, a, r′) where
xb := Σk(u0:k, ab) and x := Σk(u0:k, a) for any a ∈ A \
{ab}, u0:k ∈ Uk+1, r, r′ ∈ R, k ∈ Z+.
In Assumption 3, the benign action ab means that the sender
does not perform any particular active operations. We do
not put any assumptions on the utilities of the malicious
sender and the receiver at this moment. Instead, we make
an alternative assumption that dominates their preferences in
the next section (see Assumption 5 in Section III).
When some variables of the utilities are unavailable to the
players, expected utilities are used for choosing a reasonable
strategy instead of the utility itself. Let U¯sk : Θ × A ×
Isk × Srk → R denote the sender’s expected utility at the
kth step under a fixed sender’s strategy with a realization of
her available information for a given receiver’s strategy such
that U¯sk(θ, ak, i
s
k, s
r
k) := E [Usk (θ,Xk, ak, srk(Irk)) |isk] .
Similarly, we define the receiver’s expected utility. How-
ever, since θ is not a random variable, the expected value
cannot be taken in the normal sense. Thus, the receiver
prepares a belief pik ∈ Π such that pik : Θ → (0, 1)
represents the possibility of the type of the sender for each
time step from the viewpoint of the receiver. Let U¯rk :
R × Irk × Ssk × Π × Ss0:k → R denote the receiver’s
expected utility at the kth step under the belief such that
U¯rk(rk, i
r
k, s
s
k, pik, σ
s
0:k) := E [Urk(θk, Xk, ssk(θk, Isk), rk)|irk]
where θk ∈ Θ is a random variable obeying the probability
distribution obtained by the belief pik+1 in (1), shown below,
and σs0:k ∈ Ss0:k is a profile of sender’s strategies used for
calculation of pik+1. Note that we use the symbol σs0:k instead
of ss0:k for emphasizing that the strategies σ
s
0:k are not the
strategies that are actually chosen by the sender but the
estimated strategies from the perspective of the receiver.
The receiver updates her belief based on her observa-
tion as the time proceeds according to Bayes’ rule, which
is given by Prob(E1|E2) = Prob(E1 ∩ E2)/Prob(E2) =
Prob(E2|E1)Prob(E1)/Prob(E2) for two events E1 and E2.
The dynamics of the belief obeys
pik+1 = f(pik, i
r
k, σ
s
0:k) (1)
with an initial belief pi0 ∈ Π such that pi0(θb) +pi0(θm) = 1
and pi0(θb), pi0(θm) ∈ (0, 1) where f : Π × Irk × Ss0:k → Π
represents Bayes’ rule under a given sender’s strategy given
by
f (pi, irk, σ
s
0:k) (θ) :=
pσs0:k (i
r
k|θ)pi(θ)∑
θ′∈Θ
pσs0:k (i
r
k|θ′)pi(θ′)
(2)
where σs0:k ∈ Ss0:k represents a profile of estimated sender’s
strategies used for calculating the posterior belief and
pσs0:k(·) represents the corresponding probability under Ai =
σsi (θ, I
s
i ) for i = 0, . . . , k.
A reasonable choice of each player’s strategies is given by
a best response provided that the opponent’s strategy is given.
A sender’s strategy ssk is said to be a best response for a
given receiver’s strategy srk under the type θ when s
s
k satisfies
the condition ssk(θ, i
s
k) ∈ arg maxak∈A U¯sk(θ, ak, isk, srk) for
any isk ∈ Isk, where it is supposed that the best response
depends only on the immediate utility for simplicity. To ease
notation, we let BRsk : Θ × Srk → P(Ssk) denote the set-
valued function of all sender’s best responses for a given
receiver’s strategy. Similarly, a receiver’s strategy srk is said
to be a best response for a given ssk with the estimated
sender’s strategies σs0:k under the belief pik when s
r
k satisfies
the condition srk(i
r
k) ∈ arg maxrk∈R U¯rk(rk, irk, ssk, pik, σs0:k)
for any irk ∈ Irk. Let BRrk : Ssk ×Π×Ss0:k → P (Srk) denote
the set-valued function of all receiver’s best responses.
Finally, all models of the game and the initial belief are
assumed to be known to both players.
Basically, the players choose their own strategies along
the path generated by the best response. The best response
of the malicious sender is influenced by the receiver’s belief
through the receiver’s strategy. Thus the malicious sender is
allowed to execute aggressive actions when she recognizes
that the belief pik(θm) is small. This discussion leads us to
the expectation that, the more information on the belief is
leaked, the more serious the damage caused by the attack
is, and vice versa. From this perspective, we analyze the
behaviors of the players under covert reactions formulated
in the subsequent subsection.
D. Best Response Strategies under Undisclosed Belief
Consider the case where the receiver successfully conceals
information on the belief from the sender, namely, the case
of covert reaction. The following assumption is made.
Assumption 4 (Covert Reaction) The available informa-
tion of the sender at the kth step is given by isk =
{u0:k, a0:k−1}. The available information of the receiver is
given by irk = {u0:k, xˆ0:k, y0:k, r0:k−1}.
Note that isk does not include y0:k and r0:k−1. If r0:k−1
is available to the sender, the region of the belief can be
computed and hence r0:k−1 should be covert. Further, since
xˆk can be computed from u0:k, for keeping the belief undis-
closed the receiver necessarily conceals y0:k, with which the
transition of the belief can completely be calculated.
One difficulty for the analysis of the game under Assump-
tion 4 is that a commonly used equilibrium concept, such
as perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, cannot be employed
because the players are unable to compute the equilibria
for deciding reasonable actions. To handle this situation, we
introduce a novel framework in the following discussion.
From the perspective of the sender, one approach for
choosing a reasonable strategy without the exact value of
the belief is to estimate the belief only with available
information. We suppose that the sender uses the condi-
tional expected value given a sender’s strategy and the
available information as an estimation of the belief. Let
pˆik ∈ Π denote the estimated belief given by pˆik+1 =
EXpik (θ, s
s
0:k, i
s
k, s
r
0:k, σ
s
0:k) with EX
pi
k : Θ×Ss0:k×Isk×Sr0:k×
Ss0:k → Π defined by EXpik (θ, ss0:k, isk, sr0:k, σs0:k)(θ′) :=
E [pik+1(θ′)|θ, ss0:k, isk, sr0:k, σs0:k] where σs0:k is the estimated
sender’s strategy profile from the receiver’s side used for the
Bayesian inference (2). With the estimation, the sender can
choose ss∗k according to s
s∗
k ∈ BRsk(θ, sr∗k )
sr∗k ∈ BRrk(ss∗k , pˆik, σs0:k)
pˆik = EX
pi
k−1(θ, s
s
0:k−1, i
s
k−1, s
r∗
0:k−1, σ
s
0:k−1)
(3)
provided that σs0:k is known.
Since the exact values of σs0:k are private information
of the receiver, however, the sender has to estimate the
estimated sender’s strategies to obtain a reasonable strategy
as well. Let σˆs0:k denote the estimation of the estimated
strategies σs0:k. Because sender’s strategies must be chosen
to be reasonable, the conditions
σˆsi ∈ BRsi(θ, σˆri)
σˆri ∈ BRri(σˆsi , ˆˆpii, ˆˆσs0:i)
ˆˆpii = EX
pi
i−1(θ, σˆ
s
i−1, i
s
i−1, σˆ
r
0:i−1, ˆˆσ
s
0:i−1)
for any i = 0, . . . , k are expected to hold under another
estimated sender’s strategy ˆˆσs0:k. Likewise, further estima-
tions are required over and over and the same procedure is
performed infinitely many times.
In this paper, we suppose that the sender uses the true
strategies ss0:k as the estimated strategies σ
s
0:k for truncating
the infinite chain of estimations. Then we can define reason-
able sender’s strategies based on best responses as follows.
Definition 1 (Best Response Strategy) A sender’s strategy
profile {ssk}k∈Z+ is said to be a sender’s best response
strategy profile when there exists {srk}k∈Z+ such that s
s
k ∈ BRsk(θ, srk)
srk ∈ BRrk(ssk, pˆik, ss0:k)
pˆik = EX
pi
k−1(θ, s
s
0:k−1, i
s
k−1, s
r
0:k−1, s
s
0:k−1)
holds for any k ∈ Z+, θ ∈ Θ , isk−1 ∈ Isk−1.
Definition 1 is obtained by simply substituting ss0:k to σ
s
0:k
in (3). Note that, although we can define receiver’s best
response strategies in a similar way, we do not explicitly
state the definition because it is unnecessary for our analysis.
The main objective of this study is to investigate the
benefit induced by the confidentiality of the reactions on
the resilience of the control systems. More precisely, we
aim at analyzing the reasonable behavior of the malicious
sender under covert reactions. Based on the preparation, we
mathematically analyze sender’s best response strategies in
the next section.
III. ANALYSIS: ASYMPTOTIC SECURITY
In this section, we reveal that the control system can be
guaranteed to be secure in an asymptotic manner through
covert reaction, which results in asymptotic security.
A. Definition of Asymptotic Security
First of all, we claim that the benign sender always
chooses ab under any best response strategies at any time.
Proposition 1 (Benign Sender’s Strategy) Under
Assumption 3, any sender’s best response strategy profile
satisfies ssk(θb, I
s
k) = ab almost surely for any k ∈ Z+.
Proof: Assumption 3 directly leads to the claim.
To clearly state the resilience achieved through covert
reaction, we define a notion of security as follows.
Definition 2 (Asymptotic Security) The control system is
said to be asymptotically secure when any sender’s best
response strategy profile satisfies ssk(θm, I
s
k) → ab almost
surely as k →∞.
Definition 2 means that the reasonable strategy of the mali-
cious sender converges to the benign one regardless of her
available information. Note that in Definition 2 the limit in
A is taken in the following sense: A sequence of actions
ak ∈ A for k ∈ Z+ converges to a ∈ A when there exists
N ∈ Z+ such that ak = a for any k > N , which is obtained
by giving the discrete topology [35] on A.
B. Asymptotic Security by Covert Reaction
While the preference of the benign sender is determined in
Assumption 3, we have made no assumptions on preferences
of the malicious sender and the receiver. We here make a
reasonable assumption that should be satisfied by sender’s
best response strategies instead of making an assumption on
their utilities themselves.
Assumption 5 (Players’ Preference) Any sender’s best re-
sponse strategy profile satisfies Prob
(
E{ssk}
)
= 1 where
E{ssk} :=
{
ω : lim sup
k∈Z+
pim,k(ω) < 1 under {ssk}
}
,
which belongs to F, with pim,k := pik(θm).
Assumption 5 means that any possible belief does not ap-
proach one if the sender’s strategy is given by best responses.
In other words, rational malicious senders avoid the situation
where the receiver has a firm belief on existence of the
malicious sender. This assumption can be regarded as a
replacement of an assumption on the utilities of the malicious
sender and the receiver for determining their preferences.
Although it is more desirable to derive the statement in As-
sumption 5 from an appropriate assumption on the utilities,
we treat the claim as an assumption in this paper.
Based on the preparation, the following theorem, the main
result of this paper, holds.
Theorem 1 (Asymptotic Security) Let Assumptions 1 to 5
hold. Then the control system is asymptotically secure.
Essentially, Theorem 1 is derived from the monotonicity of
the estimated belief shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity of Estimated Belief) Assume
that {ssk}k∈Z+ is a sender’s best response strategy profile.
Then under Assumptions 1 to 5
pˆik+1(θm) ≥ pˆik(θm)
almost surely, where the equality holds if and only if
ssk(θm, i
s
k) = ab.
For the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, see Appendix.
Lemma 1 implies that the estimated belief on existence
of a malicious sender does not decrease regardless of what
strategy the malicious sender chooses at the kth step. Further-
more, the estimated belief is invariant only if she chooses the
benign action, which is the most unsuspicious behavior. Be-
cause of the monotonicity of the estimated belief, strategies
that can be chosen by the malicious sender are eventually
restricted as the time proceeds. When the expected belief
becomes sufficiently large, the possible strategy becomes the
benign one alone, which is the claim of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 implies that the control system is guaranteed
to be secure in an asymptotic manner if the receiver’s belief
is kept to be undisclosed through covert reactions. The result
clarifies the relationship between secrecy of the defender’s
belief and the resilience of the control system to be defended.
What should be emphasized here is that no particular as-
sumptions are made on the structure of the control system
and the sender’s utility function except for Assumption 5,
under which the sender avoids having the receiver have a
firm belief on existence of a malicious attacker. In other
words, the finding is irrelevant to the control system and
the objective of the attacker. In this sense, the result implies
that covertness of reactions is an essential requirement for
enhancing resilience of control systems.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We confirm the validity of the theoretical results through
a simple numerical example. Suppose that all sets of signals
and actions are binary, i.e., X = Y = U = A = R = {0, 1}.
The input signals Uk are supposed to be independent and
identically distributed with prob(Uk = 0) = prob(Uk =
1) = 0.5. The system is given by Σk(u0:k, 0) = uk and
Σk(u0:k, 1) = 1−uk. The channel characteristic is given by
λk(0|0) = λk(1|1) = λ with a given λ ∈ (0, 1) \ {0.5}. The
utility of the benign sender is given by Usk(θb, x, 0, r) = 1
and Usk(θb, x, 1, r) = 0. The other utilities are given by
Usk(θm, x, a, r) =

3, if a = 1, r = 0,
2, if a = 0, r = 0,
1, if a = 0, r = 1,
0, if a = 1, r = 1,
Urk(θ, x, a, r) =
 1, if θ = θb, r = 0,α, if θ = θm, r = 1,
0, otherwise,
where α is determined such that αpi = 1 − pi with a given
pi ∈ (0, 1). The numbers 0 and 1 mean a nonaggressive action
and an aggressive action, respectively. The utility functions
infer that the malicious sender prefers the aggressive action
and the nonaggressive action when the receiver chooses the
nonaggressive action and the aggressive action, respectively,
and the receiver chooses the aggressive reaction when the
sender is doubtful. Specifically, the malicious sender’s best
responses are given by a = 0 if r = 1 and a = 1 if r =
0. The receiver’s best response is given by r = 1 when
pik(θm) ≥ pi and otherwise r = 0.
In Fig. 3, the curves represent the malicious sender’s
estimated belief, two sample paths of the receiver’s exact
belief, and the empirical mean of the exact belief obtained
under twenty trials where the broken line represents the
boundary pi. The curves are obtained under λ = 0.55 and
pi = 0.85 with the initial belief pi0(θm) = 0.15. Because
the sample path of pˆik(θm) is independent of the elementary
event under this setting, only the unique path is drawn. The
receiver’s belief in the result is calculated with the true
sender’s best response. As observed in the figure, the curve
of the estimated belief pˆik(θm) monotonically increases as
the time proceeds in contrast to the exact beliefs pi(1)k (θm)
and pi(2)k (θm). When the estimated belief exceeds pi, the
malicious sender’s best response becomes the benign one
and subsequently the estimated belief is kept to be invariant.
Moreover, it can be confirmed that the analytic mean pˆi(θm)
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Fig. 3. The time sequence of the sender’s estimated belief pˆik(θm), two
sample paths of the exact receiver’s belief pi(θm), and the empirical mean.
is close with the empirical mean, represented by the dotted
line. The result numerically indicates the asymptotic security
of the control system guaranteed in the theoretical findings.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered a defense mechanism
for resilient control systems with reactions. The behaviors
of a malicious attacker and the defender have been analyzed
through a repeated signaling game. It has theoretically been
discovered that asymptotic security is achieved by covert
reaction. The result indicates the importance of covertness
of reactions for enhancing resilience of control systems.
One important future research direction is to consider
cumulative utilities and strategies with memory instead of
the immediate utilities used for deciding the players’ best
responses. In the current setting, because the sender does not
care about future transition of receiver’s belief, the malicious
sender tends to choose an aggressive action even if it leads
to a rapid rise of the belief, which could be unreasonable
in practical situations. Another direction is to consider the
case where there is a feedback from the reaction to the
system state. It is expected that the same results hold if we
can make the effects secret to the sender by utilizing the
internal structure of the control system. Moreover, analyzing
“transient security” in the proposed framework is an open
problem. The difficulty arises from computational complex-
ity of best responses for general control systems. Finally,
this paper is built on the premise that the sender uses her
own strategy as the strategy estimated by the receiver for
truncating the infinite chain of estimations. Analysis of the
case where multiple estimations are used for determining
reasonable strategies is included in future work.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Fix an elementary event and consider corresponding re-
alizations. All probabilities in the proof are taken with
Ak = s
s
k(θm, I
s
k). Since {ssk} is a sender’s best response
strategy profile, with σs0:k = s
s
0:k we have pˆik+1(θm) =∑
irk∈Irk
f(pik, i
r
k, s
s
0:k)(θm)p(i
r
k|θm, isk). Since p(irk|ir′k−1) = 0
if ir′k−1 6⊂ irk, we have
p(irk|θm, isk) =
∑
ir′k−1∈Ir′k−1
p(irk|θm, isk, ir′k−1)p(ir′k−1|θm, isk)
= p(irk|θm, isk, irk−1)p(irk−1|θm, isk)
where irk−1 ⊂ irk. Because {Uk}k∈Z+ are mutually in-
dependent and ak−1 is uniquely determined from isk−1
with the given sender’s strategy profile, it turns out
that p(irk−1|θm, isk) = p(irk−1|θm, isk−1, uk, ak−1) =
p(irk−1|θm, isk−1), which yields
pˆik+1(θm) =
∑
irk∈Irk
p
(
irk|θm, irk−1
)
pik(θm)∑
θ′∈Θ
p
(
irk|θ′, irk−1
)
pik(θ
′)
·p(irk|θm, isk, irk−1)p(irk−1|θm, isk−1).
We will reduce the index variable of the summation.
Because the control system is a deterministic system, xˆk
is uniquely determined once u0:k is fixed. Hence, from
Assumption 4, if uk, xˆk /∈ irk for uk ∈ isk and xˆk =
Σk(u0:k, ab), then p(irk|θ, isk, irk−1) = 0. Thus we have
pˆik+1(θm)
=
∑
yk∈Y
∑
irk−1∈Irk−1
p
(
yk|θm, irk−1, uk, xˆk
)
pik(θm)∑
θ′∈Θ
p
(
yk|θ′, irk−1, uk, xˆk,
)
pik(θ
′)
·p(yk|θm, isk, irk−1)p(irk−1|θm, isk−1).
Since the estimated state xˆk is uniquely determined from
irk−1, we have p
(
yk|θm, irk−1, uk, xˆk
)
= p(yk|θm, isk, irk−1),
which we denote by pm(yk, irk−1). With the similar notation
pb(yk, i
r
k−1) := p(yk|θb, isk, irk−1), we have
pˆik+1(θm)
=
∑
yk∈Y
∑
i∈Irk−1
pm(yk, i)
2pik(θm)p(i|θm, isk−1)
pb(yk, i)pik(θb) + pm(yk, i)pik(θm)
where i is used instead of irk−1 for simplifying the expres-
sion. The equation can be rewritten as
pˆik+1(θm) =
∑
i∈Irk−1
Gk(i)pik(θm)p(i|θm, isk−1) (4)
where Gk(i) :=
∑
y∈Y
pm(yk, i)
2
pb(yk, i)pik(θb) + pm(yk, i)pik(θm)
.
We investigate the exact lower bound of Gk(i) for a fixed
i. Omitting the notation i and k, we let my := pm(yk, i) and
by := pb(yk, i), which satisfy
∑
y∈Y my =
∑
y∈Y by = 1.
Define g(α,m, b) :=
∑
y∈Y
m2y
αmy+(1−α)by where m and b
contain all my and by , respectively, and α ∈ (0, 1). Since
m2y
αmy + (1− α)by =
my
α
− 1− α
α
· myby
αmy + (1− α)by ,
we have
g(α,m, b) =
1
α
∑
y∈Y
my − 1− α
α
·
∑
y∈Y
myby
αmy + (1− α)by︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:h(α,m,b)
.
From the weighted arithmetic mean–geometric mean in-
equality, it turns out that
h(α,m, b) ≤∑y∈Y mybymαy b1−αy = ∑y∈Y m1−αy bαy
≤∑y∈Y {(1− α)my + αby} = 1.
By using this inequality, we have g(α,m, b) ≥
1
α
∑
y∈Y my − 1−αα = 1. Since Gk(i) = g(pik(θb),m, b),
we have Gk(i) ≥ 1, where the equality holds if and only if
my = by for any y ∈ Y .
From the lower bound of Gk(i), we have pˆik+1(θm) ≥∑
i∈Irk−1 pik(θm)p(i|θm, i
s
k−1) = pˆik(θm) where the equality
holds if and only if p(yk|θb, isk, irk−1) = p(yk|θm, isk, irk−1)
for any yk ∈ Y, irk−1 ∈ Irk−1. Since p(yk|θ, isk, irk−1) =
λk(yk|Σk(u0:k, ssk(θ, isk))), the positivity of the mutual in-
formation in Assumption 1 yields Σk(u0:k, ssk(θb, i
s
k)) =
Σk(u0:k, s
s
k(θm, i
s
k)). Thus, from the input observability in
Assumption 1, ssk(θb, i
s
k) = s
s
k(θm, i
s
k). From Proposition 1,
the claim holds.
Proof of Theorem 1
Fix an elementary event in E{ssk} and consider correspond-
ing realizations. Because {pˆik(θm)}k∈Z+ is bounded above,
Lemma 1 implies that there exists pˆi∗m ∈ [0, 1] such that
pˆik(θm)→ pˆi∗m as k →∞.
We show that there exists N ∈ Z+ such that pˆik(θm)
is identical for k > N by contradiction. Assume that
pˆik+1(θm) > pˆik(θm) for any k ∈ Z+. Then for any
 > 0 there exists N ∈ Z+ such that pˆi∗m −  <
pˆik(θm) < pˆi
∗
m for any k > N . From the uniform
boundedness of the mutual information in Assumption 1,
lim supk→∞maxy∈Y,i∈Irk−1 |pm(yk, i)−pb(yk, i)| > 0. Be-
cause Gk(i), defined in (4), is a continuous function with
respect to pm(yk, i) and pb(yk, i) and pˆi∗m < 1 from Assump-
tion 5, we have lim supk→∞maxi∈Irk−1 Gk(i) > 1. Then
there exists  > 0 and k ∈ Z+ such that pˆik+1(θm) > pˆi∗m
holds when pˆi∗m− < pˆik(θm), which leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, there exists N ∈ Z+ such that pˆik(θm) is
identical for k > N . Hence, from Lemma 1, ssk(θm, i
s
k) = ab
for k > N , which proves the claim.
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